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Statehood and nation-building, wars and social transition were some of 
the basic (internal) elements which determined the complexity of identity 
changes in Croatian society at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 
1990s. The shift to plural society at a time of increasing national tensions in 
Croatia and Yugoslavia activated wide-scale identity reconstruction, ranging from 
a tendency toward modernization to a revival of violent and exclusive ethno-
national paradigms. Extremely complex historical circumstances, combined with 
the extraordinary tempo of change – “the acceleration of history” – resulted in 
some controversial aspects of identity reconstruction: the concept of nation-
state building in relation to identity, the problem of redefining the identity of the 
warring nations in terms of national homogenization and the implementation of 
the so-called humane resettlement of nations as solutions to interethnic conflict. 
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Contemplating trends in European history during the final decade of the 
20th century (1993), Alain Minc recalled that the vision of a “privileged people” of 
the nation-state in the past, as in the present, easily devolved to extremes: “… 
when viewed from the standpoint of jus sanguinis, the European map is 
inextricable, it signifies chain of conflicts”; the 1990s led to the violation of “the 
taboo which guaranteed peace on the continent for almost a half-century: the 
one concerning the integrity and inviolability of borders”(Minc 2008: 29, 38). 
Minc’s observations were among the many analyses that dealt with the collapse 
of the multiethnic Yugoslav state and the creation of nation-states on its ruins. 
“Local spasms in the Balkans” prompted an entire avalanche of questions in 
which there was no lack of controversy. The emergence of national 
homogenization prompted the exclusively understood right to national self-
determination and, ultimately, the establishment of independent nation states. 
These processes activated a “preserved” identity, outdated notions of self-
identification caught in various stages of the development of national ideologies 
and national integration processes of the 19th and 20th centuries. 
In this complex historical context, this paper will parse and analyse the 
phenomenon that marked the identity controversies in Croatia and Yugoslavia 
from the standpoint of affirmation of the nation-state. What consequences did 
statehood aspirations have on the changes in identity of the warring nations 
(which become national minorities after the collapse of the Yugoslav state and 
the establishment of new nation-states)? What led to the attempt to implement 
the idea of exchanging populations between the warring factions? Were these 
phenomena the result of inter-ethnic conflict which became a genocidal war or 
the a priori ideological paradigm of the leading Croatian and Serbian politicians? 
In methodological terms, this work is a historical and political-science 
study of very recent history. Together with the incorporation of the relevant 
scholarly and political assessments of events and phenomena that emerged at 
the time or with a short time delay, this work is based on an analysis and 




Identity, transition and the dissolution of Yugoslavia 
In his analysis of the dialectics of national identity in Yugoslavia, John 
Allcock pointed out that “identity can neither be defined nor function at either 
the personal or collective level without reference to others – those who are not 
like us and from whom we need to distinguish ourselves. Who ‘we’ are is in 
variably defined in relation to who ‘we’ are not” (Allcock 2000: 328). In this 
respect, a vital role was “played by symbols of national identity as ‘border guards’ 
demarcating groups from one another” (Allcock 2000: 328). As observed by 
sociologist Slaven Letica, who tried to define the ethnocentric background of the 
Croat-Serb relationship (in terms of the most important Yugoslav national 
rivalry), national demarcation could be explained by the concept known as the 
narcissism of small differences. Namely, “some of the ethnic and cultural 
differences between Serbs and Croats (e.g. differences in languages, customs, 
etc.) are so small that their conservation and emphasis in certain historical and 
political circumstances become a matter of preservation of ethno-national 
independence. And that is the source of intolerance and aggression in inter-
ethnic relationship” ( ovi  1991: 11-12). 
Many conflicts that had developed in Yugoslavia long before 1991 
exhibited a tendency to define the constitutional character of each national 
group – in order to gain their own national state – as “belonging primarily to an 
ethnic group, to the ethnos, and not the demos” (Dimitrijevi  2012: 20). In 
political practice, this tendency meant that despite the declarative commitment 
to human rights and democratic values–proclaimed by all participants in the 
break-up of Yugoslavia – diversity became not just an undesirable but moreover 
a troublesome factor (Bing 2008: 215). The transitional process of political 
liberalization in Croatia in the 1990s led to a re-evaluation of many cultural and 
other forms of identities: economic, religious, generationally-dictated, rural and 
urban, regional, etc. However, the most decisive factor was the emergence of the 
nation as the prevailing form of identification, and, consequently, nationalism as 
the dominant value system “which lay at the core of identity politics in 1990s 
Croatia” (Prica 2012: 133). The changes associated with the violent collapse of 
Yugoslavia had a substantial, probably crucial, impact on the formation of 
contemporary Croatian or post-Yugoslav social and collective identities. 
Very different and controversial transformations of identities (these 
processes have both a temporal and spatial character) can be identified in this 
historical context. Most analyses of Yugoslavia’s dissolution claimed that the 
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dynamics of the wars of the 1990s were in many ways another response to earlier 
conflicts that are often cited as “proof” of ancient ethnic hatreds and the 
overwhelming power of ethnic identity(Gagnon Jr. 1995: 179-197). However, 
Yugoslavia was not an exception in comparison to other transitional post-
communist countries. In 1990, Polish dissident Adam Michnik wrote that 
“nationalism is the last stage of communism: a system of thought that gives 
simple but wrong answers to complex questions” (Der Spiegel 2013). As Sabrina 
Petra Ramet picturesquely noted, “the paranoia of nationalism appeared 
everywhere in south-east Europe after 1987”; it manifested itself “in Dedijer’s 
wild-eyed howling about the Vatican-Comintern conspiracy against the Serbs; in 
Csurka’s frantic warnings about the capitalist-Jewish-Masonic conspiracy against 
the Hungarians; in the occasional sermons of Zhirinovsky on the need of all Slavs 
to unite in self-defence; in the frequent articles on Germany as the ‘Fourth Reich’ 
published in Miloševi ’s press in the late 1980s and early 1990s” (Ramet 2004: 
58). 
On the other hand, there was a significant difference between Yugoslavia 
and other transitional countries. Yugoslavia had been arguably an open – 
although communist – country and, as some observers thought, the most 
successful experiment in building a multinational society in Europe since the 
Second World War (Denitch 1994: 1). The unravelling of the Yugoslav federal 
state union dictated a redefinition of the status of the republics as its constituent 
units; in this process the question of redefining national identities came to the 
forefront. Even before the formal collapse of Yugoslavia, endless discussions on 
the self-determination and secession rights of the nation were held, while issues 
concerning the historical and cultural legacy of each individual nation re-
emerged, as did, consequently, the question of national identities as the basis for 
statehood. 
Establishment of the Croatian nation-state and identity in flux 
One of the fundamental problems of achieving state independence with 
regard to identity issues was the definition of political nation; ethno-confessional 
identity became the prevailing identity pattern and demarcation line among 
nations. Questions of national survival and defence of the “living space” imposed 
the problem of defining the borders of the new state. The territory, and not the 
people, became the priority of all nationalist and greater state programs. The 
population was often treated “as a demographic war-base or as a replacement 
herd” (Topalovi  2000: 60). In the imagination of some of the leading Croatian 
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and Serbian politicians, the borders of the newly established nation-states were 
supposed to include as much of the parent nation as possible; these tendencies 
influenced the state-building concepts and inevitably reflected in the perception 
of identity (e.g. the Yugoslav nationality disappeared). Moreover, a nationally 
homogeneous space began to be treated as one of the main factors of regional 
stability. 
The conflict between two revolutionary concepts of Croatian statehood 
(the Ustasha and the communists) during the Second World War was crucial to 
the development of the Croatian state idea in the post-war era (Bing 2013: 129-
154). Despite the all-Croatian reconciliation proclaimed by Franjo Tu man, who 
was elected Croatia’s president in 1991, two divergent notions of Croatian 
statehood came to the fore: the nationalist Independent State of Croatia (NDH) 
and “communist Partisan Croatia” as a part of a new Yugoslav state (Sirotkovi  
2002: 140). 
Within these ideological differences in interpretations of identity, the 
fundamental divergence pertained to two different concepts of the political 
nation and state territory, which was ultimately reflected in the policy towards 
minority issues (Bing 2015). In both options, the nation was one of the central 
political issues. Socialist internationalism and transnational Yugoslav identity 
never seriously challenged national particularism and interests; moreover, the 
affirmation of the Yugoslav republics as a nation-state in the Yugoslav 
Constitution of 1974 (a federation with elements of confederation) was 
confirmed by Josip Broz Tito (Ribi i , Tomac 1989). On the other hand, Tu man’s 
reconciliation policy facilitated the reaffirmation of different versions of political 
nation concepts. They reaffirmed the “preserved” historical identity (especially 
from the period of the NDH); e.g., members of the Muslim and, in the rarer cases, 
of the Orthodox faith were actually deemed political Croats (in the sense of the 
political nation). Identity issues directly reflected the interpretation of the 
territorial reach of each nation-state. In contrast to the ‘communist’ versions of 
the territorial organization, i.e., the Socialist Republic of Croatia, which was based 
on the so-called AVNOJ borders established after World War II, most Croatian 
political émigrés referred to Croatian ethnic and historical territories 
(Independent State of Croatia 1990). The uncritical linkage of “all Croatian lands”, 
which primarily pertained to parts of Bosnia inhabited by Croats, can be seen as 




The exclusive interpretation of national self-determination (proclaimed by 
all Yugoslav nations) and the overlapping of “ethnic and historical” territory led 
to contentious disputes not only among the Yugoslav peoples, but also within 
individual national bodies. The nationalist argument was accepted with some 
reserve in the international community, as noted by Sabrina P. Ramet, one “can’t 
say that ethnarchy and the concept of the nation-state are atavisms”; the very 
idea of state-building (in the case of Serbia, the “Piedmontization” of Yugoslavia, 
in the case of Croatia, the historical statehood right tradition) was seen in the 
West as “anti-democratic and anti-liberal”, and the main obstacle to the 
formation of a liberal-democratic state (Ramet 2001: 80). 
British historian and sociologist John B. Allcock noted that the idea of 
building a Croatian state based on the Croatian tradition of its historical 
statehood right collided with the fragmentation and historical discontinuity of 
“Croatian historical and ethnic territories”; he therefore observed that the 
“Croats have a particularly problematic and confusing picture of the relationship 
between space and the nation” (Allcock 2000: 341). In Allcock’s analysis, the 
Croatian statehood tradition (“one of the strongest elements of Croatian 
nationalism”) is considered the “legal continuity of statehood appearing in 
discontinuity through a series of political entities”; Allcock further noted that it is 
“expressed with great clarity (although in historically tendentious manner)” in 
the preamble of the 1991 Croatian Constitution and that such a formulation is 
used “to avoid direct contact with potentially uncomfortable questions” about a 
specific area built on different definitions of Croatia (Allcock 2000: 343). Although 
one can debate Allcock’s observations, they are relevant to the problems of 
legitimization of the nation-state in the process of its constitution, which were 
directly reflected on issues of identity change. 
Nationalism and identity change 
As Ivo Banac noted, there is “an underlying pattern that continues across 
the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, from the attack on Slovenia all the way 
through to the campaign in Kosovo and even its spill-over into Macedonia in 
2001, namely that ethnic cleansing and the construction of nationally 
homogenous states were not the consequence of but rather the aim of war”. 
Although “this proposition might not have been obvious to all parties in the 
encounter at the beginning of the war”, and it certainly was not the same in 
different parts of  Yugoslavia (as well as in various segments of Yugoslav society), 
“it became their common stock in the course of the conflict”. The concept of 
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national homogeneity became the predominant political pattern: “The leaders of 
the Serb, Croat, Bosniac, Kosovar Albanian and other national communities, with 
variations, evidently believed that national homogeneity, that is, statehood 
without minorities, constituted political stability and offered the only genuine 
chance for peace” (Banac 2006: 30). This processes enforced national 
mobilization which in some extreme cases led to an open genocide, 
euphemistically called “ethnic cleansing” (Gutman 1993). 
As observed by Michael Ignatieff, the first politician to begin exploiting 
nationalist rhetoric anywhere in Eastern Europe was Slobodan Miloševi  
(Ignatieff 1994). His so-called “anti-bureaucratic revolution” and 
“homogenization of the Serbian nation” sparked the rebellion of the Croatian 
Serbs, who became the fifth column of Greater Serbia aspirations. At the 
beginning of the 1990s, aggressive Serbian nationalism greatly influenced the 
direction of democratic change in the remaining Yugoslav republics, validating 
nationalism and ethnic homogenization as the dominant social trend (Bing 2008: 
215). The ultimate consequence of Miloševi ’s demagogic attempt to reconcile 
“the communist notion of unity with national homogenisation” ended – to 
paraphrase Philip Gourevitch – with the occurrence of “genocide as an exercise 
in building community” (Svendsen 2011: 121). 
Despite significant differences, the Croatian national homogenization 
pattern was not deprived of controversies as well. As noted by Michael Libal, a 
historian, political scientist  and the head of the South-eastern Europe 
Department in the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs: “There was an apparent 
lack of sensibility by Croatian nationalists toward the Serbian memory of the 
Ustasha genocide and the legitimate concerns of the Serbs for their rights as 
distinct ethnic communities who lived in Croatia” (Libal 2004: 160). Moreover, 
Libal warned that “there was no doubt that Tu man and his followers needlessly 
antagonized the Serbs who lived in Croatia, and that with each repetition of 
pressure and increase in violence against Croatia, the position of Serbs in there 
as held by Croats further deteriorated”. However, he also claimed that those 
tendencies “could not be taken as evidence of the determination of the Croats to 
systematically violate the human and civil rights of Serbs living in Croatia”, or as 
“an evidence of a looming mass murder or genocide of the Ustasha type” (Libal 
2004: 149). 
On the other hand, the distribution of the Serbian population in Croatia 
clearly indicated that “in the Greater Serbia program, geopolitical facilities have 
a higher priority than the life of Croatian and Bosnian Serb”. In 1991, the Serbs in 
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Croatia accounted 12.1% of the population (581,663 inhabitants), while only 
3.1% of these Serbs (who together with the local Croats – themselves 1.4% of the 
total – accounted for a total of 4.5 % of Croatia’s population) lived in the territory 
of the 11 municipalities in which they were an absolute majority (Topalovi  2000: 
59). Even in the case of establishing the borders of Greater Serbian, 
approximately 30% of the Croatian Serbs would have still remained in Croatia. 
Therefore, the geopolitical projections of the Serbian regime “would leave about 
175,000 Croatian Serbs in the ‘Ustasha state’ or enforce so-called humane 
resettlement” (Topalovi  2000: 60, 61). 
Furthermore, the revival of Croatian nationalism led to peculiar and 
perplexing consequences. An assertion made by radical nationalists, mainly on 
the fringes of the Croatian political spectrum but also in the Croatian parliament, 
was that there were no Serbs in Croatia. The Serbs were actually Croats of the 
Orthodox faith. This claim was based on 19th century nation-building idea of 
Croatian politician and ideologue Ante Star evi , who claimed that all Slavs in 
South-east Europe with the exception of the Bulgarians were Croats (Dikli  2007: 
22, 23). But this view had an inconvenient consequence. The official 
interpretation of the character of the war raging in Croatia – unanimously 
supported by the national radicals –was that it was a case of Greater Serbian 
aggression; in other words, it was an attack and not a civil war. But according to 
the logic of radical nationalists, the war in Croatia was being fought between 
Catholic and Orthodox Croats. Therefore it was not just a civil, but moreover a 
fratricidal war as well. 
The members of the Croatian Peasant Party, as well as the Croatian 
Ustasha political émigré community of Muslim faith, who preserved the notion 
of the statehood tradition in the 1990s, became victims of ethno-confessional 
“purification” in Bosnia-Herzegovina (which was a part of the NDH during World 
War II) ( olan 1990). Bosniak Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina had a different 
vision of national identity and statehood, distancing themselves from the Serbs 
and the Croats alike. Due to national homogenization, which required the 
redefinition of Croat national unity in terms of confessional uniformity, Bosniak 
Muslims became an obstacle to an ethnically pure and thus stable state. Finally, 
the ethno religious division of Croats and Bosniak Muslims led to some of the 
fiercest bloodshed in the Yugoslav wars (e.g. in city of Mostar). One of the 
consequences of this conflict was the practical disappearance of the Croats of the 
Muslim faith as an identity and political factor. According to the last census in 
2016, in Bosnia-Herzegovina there are no Croats of Muslim faith (Croats are 
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Catholics only), while in Croatia Bosniak Muslims are either national minority or 
declare themselves as Croats (Dnevnik.hr 2013). 
This brief sketch on ideological and identity confusion was a lesser part of 
the problem. The refusal of the rebel Serbs to accept any Croatian state 
deepened Croatian-Serbian antagonism and influenced the status of the 
remainder of the Serbian minority in the unoccupied areas. One of the most 
compromising aspects of Croatian politics at the time was the terror against Serbs 
living in the unoccupied areas of the newly-established Croatian state in latter 
half of 1991 and throughout 1992 (Magaš 2006: 120). Besides criticism of 
Croatian policies toward Bosnia-Herzegovina, the violation of Serb minority rights 
led to a radical shift in which many advocates of Croatian independence, such as 
German human rights activist Tilman Zulch or Viktor Meier, a reporter for the 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and a foremost expert on Yugoslavia, criticized 
Croatian politics in no uncertain terms (Buden 1996/7: 36-38). Despite mounting 
criticism, some of the leading politicians in the region did not hesitate to attempt 
enforcing the old Balkan recipe for confrontation of nations: the idea of 
“humane” population transfers. 
“Humane resettlement” 
One of the most bizarre and controversial consequences of the extreme 
politicization of national identity was the attempt by Croatian and Serbian 
leaders to implement the “humane resettlement”: exchanges of “undesirable” 
minorities as a solution to national conflicts. The idea of the “humane 
resettlement” of populations, no strangers in Balkan history, fell on fertile ground 
after the spread of the conflict to Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992. On 30 September 
1992, Croatian President Franjo Tu man and the president of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, Dobrica osi , signed a solemn declaration which actually 
fostered the idea of population exchanges (Ramacharan 1997: 457). According to 
Geert-Hinrich Ahrens, who served as Ambassador-at-Large to the International 
Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (1992-1996), the declaration “was full of 
good and mostly not very realistic intentions, and contained the following 
sentence: ‘An agreement was reached with regard to more resolute action 
concerning the return of displaced persons to their homes, and allowing for a 
voluntary and humane resettlement of those persons wishing to do so between 
the two States’” (emphasis added) (Ramacharan 1997: 457; Ahrens 2007: 261). 
The document was also signed by the co-chairs of International 
Conference on Former Yugoslavia (ICFY), David Owen and Cyrus Vance. According 
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to Ahrens, the agreement on “humane resettlement” was seen as a problematic 
aspect of the negotiations: “it should have never been underwritten by two 
impeccable Western democrats” (Ahrens 2007: 261). Ahrens expressed the 
opinion that Owen and Vance “were obviously unaware of the situation on the 
ground, the notorious advertisements of property exchange, Vojislav Šešelj’s 
declarations on expulsion of non-Serb populations, and the desire of the Belgrade 
and Zagreb leaderships for ethically ‘clean’ states” (Ahrens 2007: 261). Bela 
Tonkovi , a representative of the Croats in Vojvodina, warned of a direct negative 
effect of this declaration on the Vojvodina Croats in Srijem, i.e., they were 
pressured to leave their homes and move to Croatia (Jaki  1998: 76).Ahrens’ 
assessments on the conduct of Western diplomats (in relation to their Balkan 
counterparts) may also be viewed in the context of accountability for the 
consequences of such agreements. In any case, “humane resettlement” became 
imposed as one of the arguments (proofs) of “negotiated” ethnic cleansing by the 
warring sides, or a political consensus between the Serbs and Croats on evidence 
of the impossibility of restoring the multiethnic concept of society. 
The key figure whose ideological and political views dictated the 
configuration of all aspects of the new Croatian politics was Franjo Tu man, a 
former general in Tito’s Yugoslav Army, a historian, communist dissident and the 
first elected president of the independent Croatian state. Despite his genuine 
desire to have Croatia join the democratic West (Požar 1990: 11-21),it was 
apparent that Tu man actually never overcame the exclusivity of the totalitarian 
system within which his political convictions were formed. In his most important 
book, Bespu a povijesne zbiljnosti (translated into English as Horrors of War), 
written during the eighties and published in 1989, Tu man wrote: “All of this 
successive pogrom violence against vast multitudes (sometimes numbering in 
the millions) of populations of different ethnicity always had as their aim some 
‘final’ solution: the removal of the foreign – if not hostile or fifth-columnist – 
historically isolated or contentious element from the ethnic and territorial fabric 
of one’s own national body”; Tu man further noted how “the constant repetition 
of (…) such violent, and even genocidal changes (…) always bring dual 
consequences. On the one hand, they inescapably deepen historical divisions. (...) 
On the other, it leads to ethnic homogenization among individual nations, to 
greater harmony among the national composition of the populations and state 
borders of individual countries, so this can have positive effects on future trends 
in the sense of reducing the reasons for new violence and causing new conflicts 
and international ruptures” (Tu man 1994: 163). 
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One can observe that Bespu a reflects an obsolete and rather pessimistic 
worldview on the nature of inter-human relations. However, some of the most 
influential modern analysts of present-day national problems have highlighted 
the dangers of extolling the belief in the irreconcilable nature of cultural 
differences. Ernest Gellner, for example, warned that the efforts to bring to 
fruition the nationalist imperative under certain circumstances (such as the case 
of the former Yugoslavia) must “include exchanges or expulsions of populations, 
more or less coerced assimilation, and sometimes even executions, in order to 
achieve that close relationship between state and culture which forms the 
essence of nationalism” (Gellner 1996: 175). Uta Grahardt, following on the 
observations of Zygmont Baumant, noticed that such events “always carry 
potentially reproducible connections between the crime with the idea of purified 
cultures” (Vrcan 2002: 24). 
According to documentation compiled by the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY),Tu man took the declaration rather 
seriously; when the Croatian President and his associates discussed what to do 
with the Serbs in Croatia on 17 November 1994, he said that he had signed the 
Agreement on Voluntary Relocation with then Yugoslav President Dobrica osi  
and Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, and “if there is mutual diplomatic 
recognition between Croatia and Serbia, the Serbs who do not want to live in 
Croatia should simply leave” (Šoštari  2007). An ethnically homogeneous space 
as a factor of stability remained as a constant in Franjo Tu man’s policy after the 
war as well. Something that could be heard in “official circles “even in 1996 was 
that the “titular nation must have 80 to 90 percent of the population” as a 
precondition for “development of the state and democracy” (Topalovi  2000: 
35). In a speech held in Vukovar on June 8, 1997, during the peaceful 
reintegration of eastern Croatia, Tu man assured the Serbs from the Danube 
region that they would enjoy equality and well-being just like all other Croatian 
citizens. However, he warned that “it goes without saying that there can be no 
question of all one hundred and fifty or two hundred thousand (Serbs) returning, 
so that we once again endure internal strife and war (…) History is what it is: after 
World War I there was a great population exchange between Turkey and Greece. 
Approximately six hundred and fifty thousand Turks from Greece moved to 
Turkey, and about one million and three hundred thousand Greeks moved from 
Asia Minor to Greece, etc. So not all evil ends in evil. After such evil some good 
also results” (Tu man 1998: 295). 
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How did the Croatian public respond to this ideas of population 
exchanges? At the time when the war was escalating, the idea of population 
exchanges between the warring parties remained relatively obscure in public life. 
It is also interesting that the text of declaration was presented to the Croatian 
public in somewhat amended form: “An agreement was reached on decisive 
action to return displaced persons to their homes and to allow voluntary and 
humane renewed settlement of persons who so wish between the two states” 
(the expression renewed settlement is used instead of resettlement) (Slobodna 
Dalmacija 1992). Half a year after the Tu man- osi  declaration, the Croatian 
weekly news magazine Danas published several articles dealing with 
“humanitarian and voluntary resettlement”; the focal point was the allegation 
that “today many people see such a solution as the only one that would ensure 
the long term peace in the region” (“co-existence would be possible only with 
barbed wire in between, in which both Serbs and Croats will be inmates)” 
(Popovi  1993: 10). However, one of the articles presented a survey which 
showed that “most of the citizens of Split and Zagreb do not believe that the war 
would be stopped by the so-called humane transfer of populations” (Šola 1993: 
12). 
The statements by officials and politicians reflected ambivalent attitudes. 
Despite some misgivings, the chairman of the Croatian Parliamentary Committee 
on Human and Minority Rights, Ljubomir Anti , expressed the opinion that it is 
“legitimate to ask whether it makes sense to insist on certain principles”, if “living 
together in certain areas is impossible, if forcing  coexistence creates additional 
tension which then leads to conflicts and crimes”. Anti  concluded that “here is 
no sense in being hypocritical” and if “no one is happy, not even most minorities, 
then it is also legitimate to consider the implementation of humane 
displacement” (Popovi  1993: 10).The deputy chairman of the Croatian Socio-
Liberal Party (of which Anti  was also a member), Božo Kova evi , was more 
reserved. “I believe that Croatia must not agree to toy with the idea of relocation 
of populations because it actually signifies an indirect recognition of the results 
of Serbian ethnic cleansing”. Kova evi  also warned that the eventual wishes of 
“minority ethnic groups who want to leave the state in which they live says more 
about their sense of insecurity” (Popovi  1993: 10). One of the fiercest critics of 
Tu man’s policies during the 1990s (and, ironically, his present-day apologist) 
Zdravko Tomac, observed: “Dr. Franjo Tu man signed, together with Dobrica 
osi , the current president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, an agreement 
on so-called humane resettlement, whereby politically Croatia officially endorsed 
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the Greater Serbian idea of ethnically clean states as an alleged guarantor of 
peace and stability” (Tomac 1999: 109; Hartman 2002: 216). 
A few years later historian and prominent liberal and human rights activist 
Ivo Banac, resolutely rejected any idea of population exchanges: “There is no 
humane relocation. To believe that the absence of a minority population is 
prerequisite for a country’s stability is a major misconception” (Rokni  2007). In 
an overall assessment of Tu man’s democratic deficit, sociologist Sr an Vrcan 
observed that the first Croatian president “did not seek reasons for the 
impossibility of the Croats and Serbs living together in a common state and for 
the necessity of secession in the wrong-headed, discriminatory or repressive and 
undemocratic systemic institutional arrangements – rather he sought them in 
deeper and more irrevocable differences in culture between the Croats and Serbs 
which make any form of coexistence between them impossible and 
unsustainable” (Vrcan 2002). 
The attempt to enforce exchanges of undesirable populations between 
Croatia and Serbia did not go unnoticed by the ICTY when compiling the 
indictment against Croatian generals Ante Gotovina, Ivan ermak and Mladen 
Marka  (Šoštari  2007). The prosecution managed to acquire a series of 
transcripts according to which the plan to drive Serbs out of Croatia was initiated 
as far back as 1992 in line with Tu man’s idea of the “humane” resettlement of 
the population, which was confirmed by a number of his other statements, and 
the statements of his closest associates in the period from 1992 to 1996. The 
prosecution claimed that “the expulsion of the Serbs from the Krajina area was 
in fact the long-term interest of President Tu man linked to the idea of a need 
for ethnically homogenous nations on a given territory”. Tu man “saw the ethnic 
splintering in the territory of Yugoslavia as a historical problem that could be 
addressed (…) by the relocation of populations from one area to another” 
(Šoštari  2007). 
It is an open question whether Tudjman – had he lived longer – would 
have been tried in The Hague. Nevertheless, controversies are still present in 
post-Yugoslav societies due to issues such as “humane resettlement”. Serbian 
historian Mom ilo Mitrovi  noted in 2007 that “there is no doubt that the 
independence of the countries in the former Yugoslavia was accompanied by 
premeditated, planned and organized ethnic cleansing of the territory of the 
projected or actual state communities. It is certain that all of these future states 
wanted clean or as ‘cleaner’ ethnic territories for their future nation-states as a 
strategic objective. (...) It is quite clear that there were formulated methods 
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underlying ethnic cleansing in all three warring parties” (Mitrovi  2003: 89, 94). 
Croatian social science still lacks more critical approach to sensitive issues of 
recent history such as the role of state officials in the creation of ethnically 
homogenous areas. It was therefore possible for an organization of Croatian war 
veterans submitting a request to the public prosecutor to raise an indictment 
against Dobrica osi  for the crime of “humane resettlement” while 
simultaneously deifying the first Croatian president (Index.hr 2007).In this way, a 
controversy from the past is conveyed to the present in a new form. 
Conclusion 
Under the conditions of a war waged on a national basis, the reference to 
differences in identity and culture produced a situation in which the legitimacy 
of barbarism came to the fore in the form of “absolute and total exclusion” of 
that part of the population now redefined as the “complete others”. It produced 
a new type of xenophobia, a new call for the substantiality of cultural identity 
and the ‘proper’ distinction and affirmation of every ethnic and cultural identity. 
Modern historiography has yet to examine and contextualize the particular forms 
of “ethnic cleansing” – the creation of ethnically homogenous areas – and 
establish the correlation to and historical significance of the “nationalism” that 
developed among the peoples of the former Yugoslavia. 
In that sense, the role of the first Croatian president, Franjo Tu man, is 
still an open question. A fixation with the nation and national relations, 
heightened by the historical flux of “eternal war”, wherein the “toxic and 
constant rivalry” between the Serbs and Croats figured prominently, served as an 
inexhaustible source of inspiration to the historian and statesman Tu man. In its 
essence, Tu man’s historicism was the Marxist deterministic folly on the 
unavoidable necessity of individual historical flows (e.g., the conviction that the 
only solution to clashing class relations is revolution) which was reflected in his 
stance on the resolution of “antagonistic” relations between nations. 
Although Tu man was neither a racist nor a fascist, his nationalism was 
outmoded. He strongly believed that multiethnic societies were not possible 
under post-Yugoslav conditions. The case of acceptance of population 
displacement as real-political/historicist matrix, resting on “the experience of 
centuries of events”, contradicted commitments to democracy and human 
rights. Moreover, the case of the violent collapse of the Yugoslav state showed 
that that “ethnic cleansing” could easily become a state-building method (as was 
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the case when the document on “humane resettlement” was signed while the 
war raged). 
In that complex historical context, many dilemmas that arose in the 
Yugoslav drama (only a small part thereof was covered herein) can be associated 
with some principle issues: how to apply the right of national self-determination 
in times of turmoil or war? Can the right to a (nation) state deny minorities their 
right to a homeland? What is the relationship of contemporary Realpolitik and 
geopolitics? Can national interests and statehood aspirations become a priority 
in relation to certain fundamental questions of ethics and the legitimacy of 
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